

25X1
25X1
FEB
582

COUNTRY China/Burma

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE DISTR. 29 JAN 51

SUBJECT Guerrilla Forces in Yunnan-Burma Border

NO. OF PAGES 3

25X1C

PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW) 3

25X1 DATE OF INFO. [REDACTED]

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

RETURN TO CIA LIBRARY

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CENSORSHIP ACT OF 1949, U.S. AIR FORCE IS ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE RELEASER OF THIS DOCUMENT IS IN ANY WAY RELATED TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON OR GROUP, HEAVEN FORBIDDEN DEPOSITION ON THE SAME BECOMES NULL AND VOID.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

25X1

1. Li Tuan-kai (李元魁),^{*} a former Nationalist official who is a native of Yunnan, claims to have a large number of guerrilla troops, described as ten regiments of frontier militia, throughout the province. The strength and commanders of these troops in west Yunnan are as follows (see Attachment A):

Area	Commander	Strength
Yengma (99-25, 23-33) (headquarters)	HAN Yu-ch'in (韓裕卿)	3,000
Teng-chung (98-29, 25-01)	LU Kuo-hsien (魯國賢)	500
Lungling (98-42, 24-34)	YANG Chao-lun (楊兆麟)	1,000
Chenkang (99-25, 24-07)	LI Jen-huan (李立煥)	1,500
Pushan (99-09, 25-07)	LI Chin-p'ing (李均平)	3,000
Funlung (99-22, 25-49)	LI Chiu-heng (李秋衡)	1,500
Near Shunning (99-54, 24-35)	P'AN Sheng (潘昇)	1,500
Yangpi (99-59, 25-40)	HOU Mao-ch'i (侯茂祺)	3,000
Tali (100-11, 25-43)	CH'EN Hsieh-hsun (陳學順)	500
Chakstung (101-34, 25-02)	LI Ta-chin (李大均)	500
Yun Nien (100-07, 24-26)	Not given	10,000
Merning (100-03, 23-52)	CHANG Kuo-cha (張國才)	1,000
	P'ENG Shue-tzu (彭雪秋)	1,000

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE	NAVY	NSRB	DISTRIBUTION
ARMY	AIR	FBI	[REDACTED]

25X1

Document No. 021
 No Change In Class.
 Declassified
 Class. Changed To: TS S C
 Auth. RR 70-2

Approved For Release 2004/01/22 : CIA-RDP82-00457R006700520001-4

25X1

(CONT'D). INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Shuangchiang (99-50, 23-28)	P'ENG Chi-ch'ien (彭季謙)	500
Ts'ang Yuan (倉原), near Kengma, K'a Na (卡瓦) tribe	T'IEN Hsing-wen (田興文)	1,000
	T'IEN Hsing-wu (田興武)	
Lantsang (99-59, 22-35)	SHIH (石), aboriginal chief	300
Territory between Mengting (99-05, 23-33) and Pan- kung (99-06, 23-17)	HAN Wan-hsien (旱萬賢)	200
Between Kongma and Shunning	WEN Hsing-chou (文興周)	600
	WU Chin-ch'un (木錦春)	

Various chieftains along the Burmese border.

2. The territory in which the guerrillas operate is practically under their control, particularly the towns of Kengma, Shuangchiang, Mengtung, and Chankang, the first three of which have never been occupied by the Communists and the fourth only partly occupied. In addition, they have strong local support at Paoshan.^{**} The guerrilla units have existed up to the fall of 1950 through provision by the local population of food and some other supplies, and the sentiment in the area is heavily anti-Communist. Guerrilla activity has included the assignment of groups of workers to distribute anti-Communist propaganda in various localities, and their work has focused and directed the extensive anti-Communist feeling which previously existed.

3. The guerrilla forces are equipped with radio, although the sets are weak in power and short of replacement parts. Radio work is directed by CHANG Chieh-min (張覺民), a former employee of the Nationalist Ministry of Communications, who is technically well-qualified. The radios receive Central News Agency broadcasts successfully.

4. In the territory around Kengma, the guerrillas control an airfield 30 li (approximately 27 miles) northeast of that city, on the west bank of the Lantsang River (100°-40', 23°-25'). The field is 30 li (approximately ten miles) long north to south and ten li (approximately three miles) wide east to west. It has a hard solid foundation (material not specified) with a 3000-meter (approximately 9840 feet) crushed rock runway laid on top. The field may be reached by flying northward along the Nu River (98°-40', 24°-25'), then following the Wanting River (99°-40', 23°-25') to Kengma, where contact can be made with the radio station for landing. The field is identified by three T-shaped white panels placed across its center (see Attachment B).

5. Routes of approach to Kengma from Burma and Thailand are the following (see Attachment 6):

 - Rangoon to Lashio to Kunlung (98-40, 23-25) to Kengma.
 - Miehsai to Ta Ch'i (大其) to Chingtung (100-54, 24-27) to Ma Chan (馬站) to Lu Lien (羅列) to Hung Tsung (鴻眾) to Ta Chung Nung (大中弄) to Hung Kuua (弄虎) to Hsi (息) to Yang ta (楊打) near Kungmingshan (99-28, 23-03) to Hsin Ti Liu (新地壩) or Henmao (98-53, 22-57) to Yung Ho (永和) to Mengtung (99-15, 23-09) and thence to Kengma

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. The former Nationalist 3 and 26 Armies are in an adjacent area on the Yunnan-Burma border. Under pressure of Burmese troops, they returned from the Burmese to the Chinese side in October, and they have reportedly suffered considerable losses of arms from border bandit (not Communist) groups. The Kengma Guerrillas do not wish to be associated with these Nationalist remnants because they consider the bad behavior of these two armies during and after the Yunnan incident would sully the militia(guerrilla) anti-Communist prestige.
7. In late October 1950, the guerrillas began to feel that they would be unable to carry on a more extensive program without some aid from outside and that unless they could attack successfully, they should not draw the attention of the Communist forces in the area. They have been considering a plan of future attack which would first build up their ten militia regiments, then move out from the areas of their strongest influence around Kengma, and strive to gain control of the Lantsang River area and the region west of it. They hesitate to attack, however, because although they feel certain of holding Kengma and Siwangchian; and the other two towns, they are aware that even one Communist division could defeat them and deprive them of their present strong points around Kengma.
8. The commander states that in order to launch a successful attack, he would require funds and equipment for one infantry regiment, so that he could establish a training corps to prepare reliable junior officers for the militia. With this foundation, he believes the guerrillas could establish themselves at Paoshan and build up their strength to 50,000 by organizing and training militia units from the surrounding hsien. Outside aid is necessary because the anti-Communist sectors are poverty stricken and unable to supply either arms or money beyond the support they are already giving. Paoshan, however, is a wealthy town capable of feeding large numbers of troops, and if it were once taken, the guerrillas believe that from there they could fight off even several Communist armies.

25X1A

Comment. Li Tuan-kai, a former subordinate of T'ANG Lin-chu and commander of the Communist 42 Division of the 14 Army, defected to the Nationalist in early November 1950.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

Comment. [redacted] reports that an unidentified division of the 14 Army is in Fagshen.

Attachments:

- a. Disposition of guerrilla units, west Yunnan.
- b. Mengch'a Airfield.
- c. Routes of approach to Kengma from Burma and Thailand.

25X1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~